A deterministic model was developed to describe the two dominant tribal coalition based voting bloc (A and B) and other tribes (C). The first order nonlinear ordinary differential equations were deduced using predator-prey equations. The system was established to lie in feasible region. The coalition free steady state was determined. The conditions necessary for local stabilities of steady states were determined using Routh-Hurwitz criteria for stability. The condition necessary for global stability of steady state were determined using Lyapunov function. The estimated numerical bound of the registered voters was obtained as 27871013. Numerical simulation was carried out using 2013 general election scenario.
Introduction
The research studies [1] [2] [3] [4] , point to the fact that 1992 and 1997 Kenyan presidential elections were largely tribal, sub tribal, clan and family based politics. According to the study [5] , the 2014 estimates of the 'big' five tribes in terms of population are; Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12% and Kamba 11%.
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Since independence, Kenyan politics have largely been dominated by these 'big' five tribes which constitute about 72% of Kenya population. Since introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya, the presidential elections in Kenya have always been followed by election petition.
In 1992 and 1997, a Kalenjin candidate in KANU party won the two presidential elections by teaming up with Mijikenda, Maasai and some proportion of Luhya [4] . In 2002, a Kalenjin dominated KANU party had a kikuyu candidate which had hoped to retain power by having a head start of combined numerical strength of 34% (Kikuyu and Kalenjin). The opposition was very desperate to dislodge KANU Party from power in 2002, they cobbled a coalition Luo, Luhya and Kamba (combined strength 38%) under NARC party with a Kikuyu candidate. The opposition strategy of fielding a Kikuyu candidate in NARC party was to split the populous Kikuyu votes hence reducing KANU party strength, NARC party won the election [4] .
In 2007, PNU party with a kikuyu candidate banking on about 28% GEMA (Kikuyu, Embu and Ameru) votes cobbled a coalition with small proportion of other tribes while ODM with a Luo candidate cobbled a coalition of Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin with combined strength of 39%. The statistics available in appendix indicate that a PNU candidate managed to split Luhya votes and with about 15% Kalenjin votes, a PNU party candidate won the hotly contested election [4] .
The new Constitution was promulgated on 27 August 2010.It provides that President elected must garner half plus one of votes cast, together with a quarter of votes in at least 50% of the 47 Counties [6] . Since there no single community in Kenya with 50% of population, this only indirectly legitimized tribal coalition politics.
In 2013, Jubilee coalition with a Kikuyu candidate cobbled a coalition of Kikuyu and Kalenjin with numerical strength of about 34% while CORD party with a Luo candidate cobbled a coalition of Luo and Kamba with numerical strength of about 24%, Jubilee coalition candidate Uhuru won the election with 50.07% against his closest contestant Raila Odinga of CORD with 43.31% [7] .
Worldwide, various mathematic models describing dynamics of politics has been developed:
The research study [8] , developed an ODE model describing the voting trends along two dominant political parties, which are Democratic or Republican party. The impact of interactions between apathetic individuals and potential voter in politically-charged presidential campaign was investigated. The stability of the equilibrium points was used to understand the dynamics of Democratic and Republican Party. Simulation was carried out to confirm the analytical results.
The research study [9] , formulated a deterministic model to describe the dynamics of two political parties. Analysis of steady states was used to understand the dynamics of the two political parties. The analytical results were confirmed by were confirmed by simulation.
The research study [10] , emphasized the importance of mathematical modeling in modernizing political science especially predictive purpose. The research study stressed the ability of models to link models and natural world.
The studies [2] [3] [4] 7, [11] [12] [13] emphasized ethnic, sub ethnic, clan based politics in Kenya but not using the mathematical modeling.
All past presidential elections are always contested with rigging claims which have been too costly to Kenyans and sometimes degenerating in election violence. To give insight into voting pattern and projected outcomes, this research paper developed a deterministic model to describe the dynamics of the coalition of ethnic voting blocs using predator-prey equations. The two ethnic coalition voting blocs (A and B) and the rest ethnic candidates (C) were developed using voting pattern for 2002, 2007 and 2013. The ethnic categorized in C sub class is assumed to be easily influenced by A and B blocs as evidenced by past elections. The steady states were determined and stability evaluated. Numerical simulation was carried out to predict political dynamics in Kenya.
Model Development

Introduction
The study formulated a deterministic model using predator-prey equations based on ethnic, sub ethnic; clan based voting pattern and voters' numerical strength.
Model description
Let D (t) be the total registered voters in Kenya in general election which is categorized into two coalitions of populous tribes in Kenya among the 'big' five. A (t) and B (t) are the two influential coalitions. All the other coalitions of tribes and/or candidates which are not classified in A(t) and B(t) are grouped in subclass ‫(ܥ‬t). The average removal rate from registered voters due to lack of interest or death is given by ߤ, the recruitment rate for new voters after five years is given by π, θ ଵ is the rate at which registered voters are transferred from subclass C(t) to A(t) after effective contacts using predator-prey competition, θ ଶ is the rate at which registered voters are transferred from subclass C(t) to B(t) and γ is the rate at which registered voters are transferred from subclass A(t) to B(t) or vice versa. The rejected votes in general election is given by ω and the number registered voters who fails turn out in general election is given by ρ.
Model assumptions
The following assumptions were made when developing the model;
• This research study assumes homogeneous mixing of the registered voters in population.
• The study assumes rejected votes in general election(ω) and the proportions of voters who fail to turn out in general election (ρ) are shared equitably according to tribal population in Kenya.
• Since 2002, the presidential elections in Kenya are has been two tribal coalition competitions; this study assumes the impact of the third force(C) will always be not significant.
• Alliances of populous tribes are assumed to be very significant in this research study.
Model equations
The system of the first order ordinary differential equation is obtained as,
where, 
Model Analysis
The study analyzed the model by stating and proving various theorems
Feasible region and bound of the model solutions
The study determined the feasible region and bound of the model solutions by stating and proving the theorem below.
Theorem 1.
The region E is given by
is positively invariant and attracting with respect to model system (1) − (3),
Proof.
Let{ ‫,)ݐ(ܣ‬ ‫,)ݐ(ܤ‬ ‫})ݐ(ܥ‬ be any solution of the system with initial conditions greater or equal to zero
are non-negative functions of t, thus A (t) stays positive.
The positivity of ‫)ݐ(ܤ‬ ܽ݊݀ ‫)ݐ(ܥ‬ is proved along the same lines to obtain,
The time derivative of the total population along its solution path is given by:
൛1 + Ze ି(ρାωାµ)୲ ൟ, where, Z is the constant of integration. Hence,
. This proves the bounded of the solutions inside E. This implies that all the solutions of our system(1) − (3), starting in E and remains in E for all t ≥ 0. Thus E is positively invariant and attracting, and hence it is sufficient to consider the dynamics of our system in E. This completes the proof.
Coalition free steady state( )
If the presidential elections in Kenya are not determined by two pair of dominant tribe's coalition, we equate the equations(1) − (3) to zero and then set A and B to zero. We obtain, π − (ρ + ω + ‫ܥ)ߤ‬ = 0. Since
ቁ,
Existence of positive two coalition voting bloc steady state Theorem 2.
The two coalition voting bloc positive steady state exist whenever,
Proof
Let the equilibrium point be denoted by E * = (A * , B * , C * ). The steady state is obtained by setting system of equations (1) 
Clearly, C * > 0, B * > 0 when ρ ଶ + ω ଶ + µ > (θ ଶ C * + A * γ) and A * > 0 when,
. This completes the proof.
Stability of the steady states 3.4.1 Local stability of the coalition free steady state (TFS), ( )
Theorem 3.
The coalition free steady state (TFS), (E ) , is locally asymptotically stable whenever
and unstable otherwise.
Proof
The Jacobi matrix of the system of equations (1) − (3) is obtained as,
ቁ}the above Jacobi matrix becomes,
Using Mathematica software, the eigenvalues λ ୧ , where i = 1(1)3 , of the matrix J(E ) is obtained as . This completes the proof. This when interpreted means that whenever the conditions are in neighbourhoods of coalition free steady state they will move towards it whenever C < ൫ρ భ ାω భ ାµ൯θ మ ା൫ρ మ ାω మ ାµ൯θ భ ଶθ భ θ మ is satisfied.
Global stability of the coalition free steady state (TFS), ( )
Theorem 4.
The coalition free steady state (TFS), (E ). is globally asymptotically stable in Lyapunov sense whenever,
, and unstable otherwise.
Proof
We propose the Lyapunov function
The Lyapunov function ‫,ܣ(ܪ‬ ‫,ܤ‬ ‫)ܥ‬ is positive definite since, 
At coalition free equilibrium point
The condition necessary and sufficient for ‫,ܣ(ܪ‬ ‫,ܤ‬ ‫)ܥ‬ < 0 is,
This completes the proof.
The global stability implies that the conditions of A(t), B(t) and C(t) will always move toward coalition free steady state whenever
< 1,is satisfied. 
Local
Proof
The Jacobi matrix of the system of equations [(2.4.1) − (2.4.3)] is obtained as,
At tribe bloc steady state ‫ܧ{‬ * = ‫ܣ(‬ * , ‫ܤ‬ * , ‫ܥ‬ * )} the above Jacobi matrix becomes,
Using the Mathematics software, the characteristic polynomial of the above matrix [ ‫(ܬ‬E * )] is obtained as,
where λ , ݅ = 1(1)3 are eigenvalues and
The Routh table is developed in the Appendix. By Routh-Hurwitz criteria for stability, the system [(2. 
Global stability of the coalition bloc steady state (TFS), ( * )
Theorem 6.
The coalition bloc steady state (EEP),(E * ), is globally asymptotically stable in Lyapunov sense whenever,
Proof
We At coalition bloc steady state
The condition necessary and sufficient for ‫,ܣ(ܨ‬ ‫,ܤ‬ ‫)ܥ‬ < 0 is,
Numerical Results
We will estimate parameter, confirm stability of coalition free equilibrium point and simulate the model using Matlab in built ordinary differential equations solver.
Parameter estimation
According to the 2014 Kenya population estimates by the study (1), the ethnic composition in Kenya was: Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1%.
Our research study assumes the following while estimating the model parameters;
i.
The life expectancy in Kenya 2014 was 63.52 years (1) . Kenyans are eligible to pick identity cards after attaining 18 years which is a prerequisite to voting. Assuming all Kenyan citizens pick voting card at 18 years. The average voting period is 45.52 years (63.52 -18). We assume a Kenyan voter is likely to vote 9.104 times (45.52 /5) because elections occur after every five years. The average removal rate (µ) from voting bracket is 0.1098(1/9.104). ii.
A case in point, in 2013 general election TNA party whose majority supporters were Kikuyus' formed coalition with URP whose majority supporters were Kalenjins' formed Jubilee coalition party ( assumed to be A), based on ethnic representation in the population as per the study (1), π ଵ is assumed to be 0.34(0.22+0.12). Also ODM party whose majority supporters were Luos' formed coalition with Wiper party whose majority supporters were Kambas' formed CORD ( assumed to be B), based on ethnic representation in the population as per the study (1), π ଶ is assumed to be 0.24(0.13+0.11). iii.
The According to research study (1), the total registered voter in 2013 general election was 14352533. Our study assumes the votes were evenly distributed according to 2013 general election. Therefore, A(0) = 6173433, B(0) = 5340546 and C(0) = 707074, these were used as the initial condition of the model.
Numerical simulations
We shall simulate the first order ODE's using the Matlab in built solver. 
Estimated numerical results
The total registered bound voter's bound is obtained as, The condition necessary for local and global stability of coalition free equilibrium point was estimated numerically using parameter in this study are obtained as 25,459,600 < 2175950 and 0.71782 1 < 1 respectively. The condition necessary for local stability is false numerically hence the coalition free equilibrium is locally unstable however it is possible to attain global stability. Determining coalition blocs explicitly analytically and its stabilities numerically will be part of future research.
Results and Discussion
In concurrent with research studies of [8, 9] , this research study developed a deterministic model and deduced first order differential equations, determined equilibrium point and carried out numerical simulation using Matlab software, however unlike those research studies which used party based politics, my model was developed based on tribal coalition based politics. Kenya Presidential total registered voter data for the 2013 general election was used in this model simulation as the starting general election.
In concurrent with research articles [2] [3] [4] 7, [11] [12] [13] , Kenya presidential politics is ethnic based, however this research study used mathematical deterministic model approach and predicted their dynamics and estimated the total voter's bound in Kenya.
This research study if disseminated well to Kenya populace is likely to reduce election tension and rigging claims because any likely tribal coalition formed can fit in the model and, if good estimates of: rejected votes, voters who fail to turn out and how coalition are likely to sway voters in rival coalitions, the election outcomes can be predicted with some degree of precision. The analysis of the other possible tribal coalitions will be part of future research. 
